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Popular concepts of justice and fairness in Ghana: 
testing the legitimacy of new or hybrid forms of 
state justice 
 
Richard C. Crook, Kojo Asante and Victor Brobbey∗ 
 
The provision of effective, legitimate and accessible justice is one of the most fundamental 
public goods expected from a well-governed state. In this paper we compare the legitimacy 
of three state or state-supported Ghanaian dispute settlement institutions: the Magistrate’s 
Courts, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the 
land dispute committees of the neo-traditional Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs). It was 
found that popular beliefs and expectations are predominantly focused on the notion that 
justice requires a ‘balanced process for establishing the truth’, and that the procedures, 
codes and remedies used by the Magistrate’s Courts and the CHRAJ were more congruent 
with these beliefs than those of the CLSs. The findings challenge stereotypes of popular and 
traditional justice as being primarily about reconciliation or restoration of communal 
harmony, and suggest that state institutions should be supported in their current 
development of hybrid and informal kinds of dispute settlement.   
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The provision of effective, legitimate, and accessible justice through judicial institutions and 
more generally through the ‘rule of law’ is probably one of the most fundamental of all public 
goods expected from a well-governed state. By ‘rule of law’ we mean more than just the current 
neo-liberal conception of a legal system which protects private property and facilitates the 
market economy. Rule of law refers to the provision of a justice system which sustains the 
security of all citizens, particularly the most vulnerable, protects against the exercise of arbitrary 
power by the state or the powerful, and provides for the public regulation of civil disputes in 
ways which are trusted. The idea that public officials are subject to legal and moral norms is 
particularly important in ex-colonial states where the state is often perceived as a tyrannical and 
arbitrary monster (cf. Young, 1994). In addition, state law is present in everyday life insofar as 
it uses the authority of the state to enforce, regulate or define social and economic relationships, 
from marriage and sexual behaviour through to economic exchange, the disposal of property 
and the power to command the services of others (Poggi, 1978; O’Donnell, 1999). In short, the 
degree of public trust in and the legitimacy of public judicial institutions directly underpins the 
legitimacy and trustworthiness of the state itself.  
 
The ‘local justice’ research stream of the APPP was developed to undertake empirical 
investigation into what kinds of state or state-supported justice institutions in African states 
                                                 
∗  Respectively, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex (r.crook@ids.ac.uk); 
Center for Democratic Development – Ghana (kasante@cddghana.org); and CDD-Ghana 
(vbrobbey@cddghana.org). We are grateful to DFID UK and Irish Aid for their generous funding of 
this APPP research; all opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not represent DFID or Irish 
Aid. 
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might provide such legitimate, effective and accessible dispute resolution – and if so, what 
might  explain any positive outcomes.  
 
Currently, the legal systems and courts of most African countries are widely condemned as 
inaccessible to ordinary citizens because of their formality, alien procedures and concepts 
derived from their colonial origins, corruption and inefficiency. In Anglophone common law 
countries in particular, there is a deep crisis caused by overload and backlog of cases which in 
effect amounts to denial of justice by the state. In recent years, however, many African states 
have attempted to address these crises of the public legal system through reform of judicial 
institutions, particularly at the local level. The search for alternatives has included ‘popular 
justice’, revival of ‘traditional’ forms of dispute settlement and chiefs’ tribunals applying 
customary law, and various forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) ranging from court-
attached ADR provided by lawyers to state support for paralegals, NGOs and other state 
agencies providing dispute settlement services.  
 
The first phase of the research therefore looked at three different kinds of local justice 
institution in Ghana, comparing a conventional state court with a new state-sponsored ADR 
service and a land disputes resolution system based on the traditional chieftaincy authorities.1  
 
The District or ‘Magistrate’s’ Courts are the lowest level courts of first instance applying formal 
state law (which in Ghana includes customary law). They have been in existence for over 150 
years, since the time of the Gold Coast colony. Until 2002 they were called Community 
Tribunals and incorporated a lay panel of community assessors sitting with a legally qualified 
magistrate. They have now reverted to operating with a single, legally qualified or trained judge. 
Recent studies have suggested, however, that these courts have become more informalised and 
flexible in their procedures (Crook et al., 2007). Since 2005 they have also become venues for 
the Judicial Service’s national ‘Court-connected ADR’ programme, using paid para-legal 
mediators. After pilots in the Accra region, the programme has been rolled out to 25 courts 
across all ten regions, although all Magistrates are encouraged to experiment with it where they 
can. Its official purpose is to tackle the enormous backlog of pending cases in the state system 
and improve accessibility for the ‘poor and vulnerable’.   
 
The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) is a constitutional 
body under the 1992 Constitution and its autonomy and independence are constitutionally 
guaranteed. Its principal mandate is to investigate abuses of power and maladministration, 
whether by government or other agencies, which infringe citizens’ human rights as guaranteed 
by the Constitution. This includes unfair treatment of citizens by public agencies, corruption of 
public officials, and unequal recruitment practices. It is, however, unusual compared to other 
national human rights commissions in that it has a network of District Offices in around 110 of 
Ghana’s 170 Districts. These District Offices offer a free mediation or Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) service to complainants. The service has attracted increasing numbers of 
individual citizens seeking resolution of disputes, ranging from family disputes (custody of 
                                                 
1  The research was a collaboration between Richard Crook of IDS and CDD-Ghana researchers under 
the leadership of Professor Gyimah-Boadi, Kojo Asante and Victor Brobbey. We gratefully 
acknowledge the contributions of other CDD staff including Daniel Armah-Attoh and Sewor Aikins 
who worked on the questionnaires and data entry, and Kwabena Aborampah-Mensah (Programme 
Manager and mass survey supervisor).  
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children, maintenance of spouses and divorcees) to inheritance, land and property cases, 
landlord-tenant relations and employer-employee cases.  
 
The Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) are new ‘hybrid’ institutions set up by the Ministry of 
Lands from 2003 onwards. They are still at a pilot stage – only 39 have been established, of 
which only 10 have existed since 2005. They are administered by chiefs and staff employed by 
the Traditional Councils, but their function is a modern one: to record and demarcate the full 
range of local lands held under customary tenures and to record and formalise the allocation 
procedures (sale, leasing and other tenures) which are under the control and ‘allodial ownership’ 
of customary authorities – chiefs, family heads or ‘land priests’.2 (About 80% of all land in 
Ghana is held under customary tenures). The intention is to improve the transparency and 
accountability of customary land administration, and to develop land use planning and new 
revenue sources. The CLS are mandated to deal with disputes which arise over their land 
administration – particularly demarcation and definition of rights – by setting up ‘land dispute 
resolution committees’ called Land Management Committees, which bring together 
representatives of the customary authority with local government and community interests. The 
Committees are led by the chiefs and basically follow customary procedures and conventions 
relating to land, although officially they have been enjoined to offer ‘ADR’.  
 
The main focus of the research was to assess and explain the extent to which these dispute 
settlement institutions (DSIs) were providing public dispute settlement which was ‘legitimate, 
accessible and effective’. Their performance on these dimensions was judged using three main 
sets of criteria: 
 
• Legitimacy: the extent to which the codes of justice, principles, procedures and 
remedies offered by the three DSIs were congruent with the beliefs, expectations and 
demands of both the general public and of litigants who used them.  
• Accessibility: the extent to which ordinary citizens, and particularly the poorer and 
more vulnerable, were able to access and use their services, and not disproportionately 
excluded or disadvantaged by their procedures.  
• Effectiveness: the efficiency of their services in terms of speed of settlement, 
affordability, and enforcement of settlements. 
 
In this paper we focus primarily on our findings in respect of the legitimacy dimension, which 
depends fundamentally on finding out about what local beliefs and expectations of justice really 
are, and how people experience or perceive the institutions in question. It is a dimension which 
also relates most closely to one of the core concerns of the APP programme.  
 
  
                                                 
2  In Ghanaian land law, the allodial title is the ultimate title to the whole territory of the political 
community, which in Akan societies is vested in the office of the chief (not the chief personally), 
known as the ‘Stool’ (similar to the concept of the ‘Crown’ in English law). The Stool is conceived of 
as a ‘trustee’ or custodian of the land and has to manage it on behalf of the community both present 
and future. Therefore all dispositions or uses of Stool land are subject to the approval of the chief (see 
Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Articles 36(8) and 267(1)).  
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2 Legitimacy, ‘cultural repertoires’ and local concepts of justice  
 
One of the main hypotheses of the APP research programme is the proposition that public 
institutions are more likely to be effective at providing public goods if they are ‘locally 
anchored’ in ways of doing things which draw on established forms of moral obligation and 
collective action – in other words, local cultures and institutions (Booth, 2010). Those which 
successfully provide some kind of public good can be seen as ‘problem solving in the relevant 
context’. What the causal link between such institutional resources and public good outcomes 
might be is subject to empirical investigation, but it is hypothesised that ‘cultural repertoires’ 
can provide an effective source of monitoring and sanctioning, sufficient to overcome collective 
action problems in associational life or compliance problems in more formal institutions 
(Kelsall, 2009).3 Because of the ideological baggage associated with the concept of ‘tradition’ in 
Africa, and the confusions surrounding its historical transformations during and since colonial 
rule, APP does not make any assumptions about the character of these cultural repertoires; they 
may well be historic, or reinventions using historic referents, or contemporary creations 
emergent from post- colonial society (Olivier de Sardan, 2008). They therefore need to be 
established empirically in each local context, not assumed, as is often the case with stereotypes 
of African tradition and popular culture.  
 
Very few researchers have asked ordinary Ghanaians about their understandings of justice and 
the best way to settle disputes. Generally, a stereotypical assumption is made, drawn from 
anthropological literature, that popular understandings of justice correspond to ‘traditional’ or 
customary notions of restorative justice and social harmony, where the emphasis is on 
reconciliation and consensus between social collectivities.4 This view can be traced back to the 
classic works of social anthropologists such as Gluckman (1969), Fortes (1969) or Radcliffe-
Brown (1952) and later legal scholars such as Allott (1968). Their insights into the importance 
of clan, kinship and negotiated social order particularly in so-called chiefless or segmentary 
societies have been taken up and simplified into given ‘facts’ about African society by 
successive generations of administrators and policy makers since colonial times. Lord Hailey, 
for instance, writing in 1956 cites anthropologists as defining the objective of African 
customary law as ‘primarily designed to maintain the social equilibrium’ – although he also 
notes that in segmentary societies without specialised judicial institutions, injuries would often 
be resolved through ‘self-help’ (i.e. revenge) unless a compensation could be negotiated 
(Hailey, 1957, 590) – a point also acknowledged by Lucy Mair who drew careful distinctions 
between societies with hierarchical monarchical rule and those with what she called ‘minimal’ 
government (Mair, 1962). Legal scholars in the 1960s and 70s continued to argue that ‘the job 
of the [customary] arbitrator is to “restore harmony” not just find the facts’, and to consider the 
relationship not just of the individual parties but of their social groups and the community as a 
whole: ‘justice is derived from what society considers to be fair or just, not what is fixed by 
law’ (Allott, 1968, cited in Penal Reform International, 2000: 24-25). A corollary of this notion 
is that a judge or arbitrator is not necessarily expected to be a formally neutral person; it is 
expected that he has intimate knowledge of the parties and the case already and so elaborate 
rules of evidence are not seen as necessary or even appropriate (Penal Reform International, 
2000: 30).  
 
                                                 
3  The term ‘cultural repertoire’ is taken from Ann Swidler’s seminal article (1986). 
4  For a full review of this literature see Penal Reform International (2000: 24-34).   
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Some contemporary anthropologists continue to emphasize the key role of social group 
membership and negotiated rules and settlements in the context of land disputes (Berry, 1997, 
2001; Juul and Lund, 2002). And perhaps even more significantly for policy discussions on 
reform of African judicial systems, the advocates of modern ADR, as it originated in North 
America and Europe, seem to have been inspired by what they understood to be the virtues of 
traditional dispute settlement in African or Asian societies – namely the concern to establish 
socially sanctioned consensus and reconciliation between the parties (Brown and Marriott, 
1999; Silbey and Sarat, 1989). Hence ADR itself has become associated with what critics have 
called a ‘rhetoric of harmony law’ – the ‘idea that in a conciliatory model people do not fight 
but harmoniously agree on a common solution’ as allegedly existed in a ‘primitive and idyllic 
society’ (Grande, 1999: 69; cf. Nader, 2001).5 Our investigations challenge many of these 
stereotypes.  
 
Cultural repertoires are of particular importance when discussing the concept of legitimacy, 
which has been defined as the belief by citizens in the ‘rightfulness’ of an authority, in this case 
a state-supported legal institution (Poggi, 1978: 101-2). In other words, it is a moralisation of 
legal – and hence political – authority which depends upon the theories which people hold about 
what is justice and due process, and hence whether the decision of a judge as an agent of public 
authority should be respected (Schaar, 1984: 111). As Merry has pointed out, the cultural 
context of institutions which deal with conflict and dispute is especially critical because  
 
‘Disputing is cultural behaviour, informed by participants’ moral views about how to 
fight … Parties to a dispute operate within systems of meaning; they seek ways of doing 
things that seem right, normal or fair, often acting out of habit or moral conviction’ 
(Merry, 1987: 2063). 
 
The highest form of public good is when citizens believe that officials of the state and ordinary 
citizens are subject to the same codes and hence public authority is not arbitrary or lacking in 
moral worth.6  
 
One of our primary research tasks was therefore to construct a picture of local beliefs and 
expectations about dispute settlement and justice and then relate that to how the chosen DSIs 
actually worked. We sought data on what users of the DSIs (parties to disputes) and local 
communities actually seek from the state and its judicial institutions. What theories did people 
hold about what is ‘just’ or correct and fair? What did they value? What were their experiences 
of these DSIs, either directly or indirectly? (It was of course recognised that overarching 
consensus around such beliefs might not exist, and they might differ by gender, class and other 
social differences). 
 
                                                 
5  It is curious that this understanding of African law, having been recycled through a ‘Northern’ legal 
reform movement, is now being advocated back into Africa as a new way forward. 
6  It should be recognised that to find such a coincidence of popular and official ideologies of 
rightfulness is in fact quite difficult and rare even in ‘mature democracies’. In many African states, 
legitimacy may not extend beyond the narrow circles of the ruling military and bureaucratic elites (cf. 
Crook, 1987). 
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Secondly, did these local understandings correspond to the way in which the various DSIs were 
working, and the outputs they were producing? What codes, procedures and remedies were 
actually used by the various DSIs?  
 
The data were collected using a variety of methods: two case-study Districts were selected, one 
in peri-urban Accra, and the other a cocoa-growing rural District of Brong-Ahafo Region.7 In 
each, a representative sample survey of popular opinion was conducted, together with 
interviews with litigants in the three DSIs over a five-month period using a structured 
questionnaire, and anthropological observation of the DSIs in action. Although the main 
purpose of the observation was to provide information on what kinds of legal or moral codes 
and procedures were actually used by the various courts or tribunals, it also provided useful 
insights into the relationships among litigants, judges and the public attending the hearings, and 
on the responses of members of the public to the proceedings they were watching.  
 
3 Popular ideas: evidence of the mass survey 
 
The survey of popular opinion on justice and dispute settlement interviewed 800 respondents 
selected randomly from the two case-study Districts (400 in each), using a multi-stage, stratified 
area sample with random selection of households and random selection of individuals within 
households.8 The questionnaires focused primarily on people’s experiences of and opinions 
about dispute settlement, whether in court or elsewhere, paying particular attention to how 
people think about fairness, what they value in any dispute settlement process and who/what 
they find trustworthy. As far as possible, we attempted to avoid the expression of abstract 
opinions and sought to elicit responses within an action context. A large number of the 
questions were open ended, and were then post-coded. It is worth noting that respondents were 
generally willing to engage in quite substantial and serious discussion of the issues put to them, 
and we have, therefore, a high level of confidence in the robustness of the findings. Although 
our primary interest was in respondents’ experiences of and opinions about dispute settlement 
and justice, it was nevertheless anticipated that only a minority of such a popular sample would 
have actually been parties to a formal ‘case’ or dispute. The questionnaire was therefore 
structured to divide the respondents (having been randomly selected) into three main groups: (1) 
those who had actually experienced (i.e. been parties to) a case; (2) those who had witnessed a 
dispute settlement in their community; (3) those who said they had neither been involved in nor 
witnessed a dispute settlement. These were not pre-selected but identified during the course of 
the interview. The actual sample produced the following proportions in each group or subset:  
 
Subset 1 (parties to a case): 20.1% 
Subset 2 (those who had witnessed a case): 38.4% 
Subset 3 (those who had neither witnessed nor been parties): 41.4% 
                                                 
7  The choice of Districts was severely constrained by the need to find Districts where there were 
functioning CLSs alongside the other two justice institutions. Within that constraint the basic 
comparison was between rural and urban settings  
8  See Annex Tables A1-A5 for the basic demographic characteristics of the respondents in the survey. 
The survey was carried out by CDD-Ghana using recent graduates from the University of Ghana and 
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, trained by CDD and APP 
researchers. Interviews were conducted in the local languages (Twi or Ga) or English depending on 
what respondents found most comfortable.  
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3.1 Concepts of fairness and justice 
 
The most significant findings of the survey relate to how Ghanaians define fairness and justice 
in the settlement of disputes (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Respondents in Subsets 1 and 2 were 
asked to explain why they thought a case they had been party to or had witnessed was handled 
fairly or unfairly.9 Those in Subset 3 were asked a more hypothetical question: ‘IF you ever got 
involved in a case, what are the most important things about a dispute settlement institution 
which would make you trust them to give a fair settlement of your case?’ Overall, the largest 
single group of respondents across all Subsets (36.1%) gave an answer which emphasized the 
importance of the truth (‘the true facts’) being established through what could be termed ‘due 
process’ – specified as both parties being allowed to speak freely and make their case to the 
judge.  
 
Figure 1: Mass survey: popular understandings of fairness and justice (all 
respondents) 
 
 
 
The second most important set of ideas related to the qualities required of a judge, particularly 
impartiality (expressed variously as ‘not biased’, ‘honest’, ‘respects the truth’, ‘listens to both 
sides’ – 14.8%) and other qualities such as ‘competence’, ‘reputation’, ‘experience’, or being 
‘God-fearing’ (16.8%). It may be argued that the idea of an ‘impartial judge’ is very similar to 
the principle of allowing both sides to make their cases in order to establish the truth; both 
emphasise the necessity for balance in the way in which a dispute is dealt with, in order for the 
truth to come out. If the two views are combined to reflect this common underlying concept, 
then the combined percentages are very striking: 60.2% of those who had been parties to a case 
and 44.3% of those who had witnessed a case saw fairness in dispute settlement as associated 
with a balanced process for establishing the true facts, dependent on either the procedures 
themselves and/or an impartial judge. To what extent were these views the product of particular 
experiences, or were they a more generally shared mindset in the population at large? This can 
                                                 
9  The precise question was: ‘Do you think the dispute settlement procedure was fair?’ 
36.1
14.8
16.8
9.3
14.2
5.2 1.0
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Establishing truth through due process
Impartial/honest judge or arbitrator
Other qualities of judge (competent, firm, God-fearing)
Chief, elders, community expectations respected
Mutual acceptance of verdict, reconciliation
Fault identified, law enforced
Efficiency issues
Don't know
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be gauged in the first place by comparing the results for Subsets 1 and 2 with those for Subset 3 
– those who said they had no personal experience of a case. 
 
Table 1: Popular understandings of justice, by type of respondent 
 
Subset 1 
% 
Subset 2 
% 
Subset 3 
% 
ALL 
% 
Establishing truth through due process 44.7  31.6  33.5  36.1  
Impartial/honest judge or arbitrator 15.5  12.7  15.4  14.8  
        Subtotal 1 +2  60.2 44.3  48.9 50.9  
Other qualities of judge (competent, firm, 
God-fearing) 
5.6 1.3 35.3 16.8  
Chief, elders involved, community 
expectations respected 
0.0 13.4 9.4 9.3  
Mutual acceptance of verdict, reconciliation 14.9 28.0 0.0 14.2  
Fault identified, law enforced 5.6 10.1 0.0 5.2  
Efficiency issues (delay, cost etc) 3.7 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Don’t know  0.0 0.0 6.3 2.7  
Note: For Subset 3, the question asked was ‘If you ever got involved in a case, what do you think are the 
most important things about a dispute settlement institution which would make you trust them to give a 
fair settlement of your case?’ This was slightly different from the question asked of subsets 1 and 2, who 
were asked to explain why they thought the procedure in a particular case they had witnessed or been a 
party to was ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’.  
 
Although a much larger proportion of subset 3 saw the quality of the judge as being the most 
important factor for a fair settlement (50.7%), the second largest group (33.6%) gave answers 
which fell into the ‘justice as due process’ category – hearing both sides, getting a balanced 
judgement. If these are added to the ‘impartial judge’ answers, a very similar percentage of this 
group (49%) shared the views of subsets 1 and 2 on ‘justice as due process’.  
 
Overall, therefore, over half of all respondents (50.9%) defined justice and fairness as ‘due 
process’ combined with an impartial judge. If those who emphasised other qualities of the judge 
which are related to impartiality, such as competence and honesty, are added then the proportion 
rises to 67.7%. It may therefore be argued that the notion that justice requires a ‘balanced 
process for establishing the true facts’ was very widespread in the general population of the 
Districts surveyed, regardless of people’s personal experiences – although it was clearly much 
more important to those who had actually been party to a case.  
 
A substantial minority of respondents expressed other views but these were more fragmented 
and therefore formed a number of minority positions which could not collectively be seen as a 
coherent alternative to the ‘due process’ concept.  
 
Thus, the third most important group of respondents overall saw fairness as requiring mutual 
acceptance of the result by both parties, expressed either as coming to an ‘understanding’ of 
each other or as some kind of reconciliation or peaceful resolution of conflict. This is an idea 
Crook, Asante & Brobbey, Popular Concepts of Justice 9 
which undeniably has importance and was found to resonate in many ways with the experiences 
of actual litigants, insofar as there seems to be a general longing on the part of people in dispute 
to attribute a moral quality to any settlement – perhaps motivated by the belief that subsequent 
hostility can be mitigated if there is mutual acceptance.10 Nevertheless, only 14.9% of those who 
had been parties to a case put forward this view, and none of those who had no experience of a 
case. Only those who had witnessed a case (Subset 2) held this view in substantial numbers 
(28%) – in fact, the second largest group after the combined ‘balanced process’ group. One 
explanation could be the different kinds of dispute settlement types they had experienced 
compared to Subset 1; much higher proportions of Subset 2 had witnessed informal, family and 
traditional forms of dispute settlements (see below).  
 
A fourth category of views emerged from Subsets 2 and 3 alone: the idea that that the ‘fairness’ 
of a dispute settlement lay in the fact that it corresponded to what people in the community 
‘expected the result to be’ (13.4% of Subset 2) or that it was necessary for chiefs or elders to be 
involved (9.4% of Subset 3). These views were combined into a category which we labelled 
‘traditionalists’ or communitarians – those who were strongly influenced by community norms 
and traditional hierarchies. Here we see some (rather limited) evidence for the existence of a 
view of justice popularised by anthropological studies of African societies, according to which 
justice is not a product of abstract impartiality or formal law but an outcome linked to 
community expectations, the premium on social peace and local knowledge of the protagonists. 
But this view was limited to a small number of those who had witnessed a local dispute 
settlement, and in the case of Subset 3 the answer could well be explained by the formulation of 
the question, since they were not being asked to assess a particular case but only to give a 
general opinion on what kind of dispute settlement procedure they might trust in a hypothetical 
situation. Caution must also be exercised about the significance of the assertion that a fair 
settlement requires the involvement of chiefs or elders of the community. One cannot assume 
that DSIs run by chiefs or community elders are necessarily associated in peoples’ minds with 
the provision of community-based or restorative justice; they might well be admired for 
providing the kind of balanced or truth seeking justice seen as ideal by the largest groups of 
respondents. This kind of ambiguity in survey results can only really be resolved with the kind 
of detailed and action-based data which comes from observation of the courts in action and from 
surveys of actual litigants.  
 
A fifth very small minority idea stressed a completely opposite viewpoint: namely the belief that 
justice means the identification of ‘wrongdoing’ or who was really at fault, and the enforcement 
of the law. This was the view of 5.2% of respondents overall (9.2% of Subset 2 respondents and 
5.6% of Subset 1).  
 
Finally it is perhaps significant that only very small numbers of respondents in any of the three 
subsets mentioned ‘efficiency’ issues such as cost and delay as being crucial to the provision of 
a fair or just dispute settlement. 1% of respondents overall (3.7% of Subset 1 respondents and 
0.7% of Subset 2) spontaneously mentioned these kinds of issues. None of those in subset 3 
raised them. This is not to say that people in Ghana are not concerned about them, particularly 
                                                 
10  Cf. Diehl’s observation that in a village community people are reluctant to go to court because they do 
not want to jeopardise social relationships – a fear which reminds us of the coercive elements which 
can underpin the pressure to accept ‘reconciliation’ (Diehl, 2009).   
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anybody who has to actually deal with judicial or other dispute settlement institutions as shown 
in the litigants’ surveys. But they are clearly not concerns that spring to people’s minds when 
asked to think about what they mean by saying a dispute has been dealt with or settled fairly.  
 
How do we explain differences in conceptualisation of justice and fairness amongst the three 
types of respondents (see Figure 2)? It is clear that those who had actually experienced a case 
were most likely to espouse the view of justice as a balanced process for establishing the true 
facts, with an impartial judge (over 60% of the subset). Those who had only witnessed a case 
being heard were much more likely to mention the need for mutual acceptance and 
reconciliation and the idea of conforming with community expectations (although these were 
still minority views even within this group). The group who said they had neither witnessed a 
case nor been party to a case were even more strongly disposed to favour due process factors 
and the good qualities required by a judge – 84% altogether with 51% focusing on qualities of 
the judge. Of this latter group, only a small minority thought that fairness required chiefs to be 
involved (2.1%) or elders (7.3%).  
 
Figure 2: Mass survey: ‘fairness and justice’ by subset of respondent 
 
 
 
It may well be that the differences between Subsets 1 and 2 were a function of the kinds of DSIs 
which they had actually experienced. In the case of Subset 1, those who had experienced their 
case in a state court formed the largest single group (32.9%) followed by a traditional chief’s 
court (24.8%), with the others fragmented amongst a wide variety of DSIs – family elders, the 
police, local government or elected officials, paralegals, and religious leaders. The experiences 
of Subset 2 were predominantly associated with more traditional and informal kinds of justice 
offered by village chiefs (48.2%) or family and community elders (13.7%) with state courts 
forming the other main group at 25.8%. It is possible, therefore, that Subset 2 respondents were 
influenced in their opinions by the tendency of informal dispute settlement, whether by a village 
chief or by family elders to focus on finding an amicable or agreed settlement. But this is by no 
means a full explanation given that nearly two thirds of Subset 1 had also experienced various 
forms of informal justice, including that offered by village chiefs. It may be argued that having 
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been involved in an actual conflict or dispute which ended up requiring a settlement in a DSI 
was the more powerful influence in predisposing this group to recognise the importance of due 
process, rather than the type of DSI they had used. Indeed the contrast with Subset 3 is perhaps 
the most powerful and telling element in the survey; those who claimed not to have any direct 
experience of any DSI gave an opinion which presumably drew upon a general set of values or 
attitudes prevalent in local society. This opinion resonated very strongly – indeed was an 
exaggerated version of – the predominant views of the other two groups, in its emphasis upon 
the need for due process and competent, balanced judges.  
 
To what extent did social differences such as gender, age, educational level or occupation have 
an influence on people’s views about justice and fairness?  The results show an extraordinary 
consistency across most of these differences, with only minor variations attributable to gender 
(see Figure 3). The age of respondents had virtually no impact on what kind of view they were 
likely to hold – there was particularly strong consistency on the ‘due process’ value – and levels 
of education seemed to make little difference either, except that respondents with a post-
secondary education (a very small proportion of the sample) were less likely to suggest that an 
impartial judge was needed, but much more likely to suggest that other qualities such as 
competence and reputation were important. On occupation, few differences of any significance 
could be discerned. 
 
Figure 3: Mass survey: ‘fairness and justice’ by sex 
 
 
 
As mentioned, some minor differences attributable to gender did show up: women were much 
less likely to emphasise the importance of reconciliation or mutual acceptance than men – an 
indication perhaps of the extent to which getting involved in a public dispute is a last resort for 
women which makes them more determined to pursue a remedy to the bitter end. And women 
were slightly more likely to argue that a judge should be competent and ‘God-fearing, and that 
community expectations were important. But these were not major differences which could give 
rise to any strong sociological or policy finding on the significance of gender in local cultures of 
justice and dispute settlement.  
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3.2 Trust in DSIs 
 
The kinds of answers which respondents gave to these contextualised questions about fairness 
and justice should be compared with their responses to the hypothetical question about trust 
which was asked at the beginning of the interview – ‘if you had a dispute, who would you trust 
to settle it?’ Respondents were given a closed list of possible choices and asked to rank each one 
from ‘trust a lot’ to ‘would not trust at all’. The most popular choice of the kind of authority 
people said they would ‘trust a lot’ was ‘village chief’ (77%) followed by a paramount chief 
(76.5%), and a family head (73.6%) (Table 2). But these ‘traditional’ choices were followed 
very closely by religious leaders (72%), court judges (69.4%) and lawyers (65.5%). 
 
Table 2: Mass survey: trust rankings – ‘trust a lot’ 
 
Rank (out of 17)  Type of DSI  % who say ‘trust a lot’ 
1  Village chief  77.0 
2  Paramount chief  76.5 
3  Family head  73.6 
4  Religious leader  72.0 
6  Court judge  69.4 
13  CHRAJ  45.0 
16  CLS  42.6 
 
The relationship between these ‘trust’ rankings and the way in which the majority of 
respondents defined what they saw as important in achieving a fair and just settlement of 
disputes raises some difficult interpretation issues and some very interesting possibilities. If 
most respondents with any experience of a dispute value impartial and balanced court processes 
which establish ‘the truth’, does this mean that they most trust chiefs or family heads to deliver 
this kind of justice? Or was there a disjunction between the kinds of people who respondents say 
they trust, at least hypothetically, and what they actually see as important for fairness and 
justice?  
 
A simpler explanation might be that respondents treated this trust question as a ‘reputational’ 
question rather than a specific request to consider the content or context of any dispute 
settlement procedure. Hence the surprising fact that religious leaders were given trust ratings 
virtually indistinguishable from those of chiefs or family heads – a sign, perhaps, of significant 
recent changes in Ghanaian society. So the high ratings given to chiefs could be a reflection of 
the general respect for the institution and were a conventional response prompted by people’s 
knowledge of or familiarity with particular institutions or authority figures. That this was the 
case is supported by the results for this question at the other end of the scale.  
 
The ratings for whether people trusted the new Customary Land Secretariats (chiefly 
institutions), or the CHRAJ, were low – 42.6% and 45% respectively, ranking 16 and 13 out of 
17 possibilities. But very large numbers of respondents gave ‘don’t know’ answers in relation to 
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these two institutions – 35.4% in the case of the CLS, and 31.1% in the case of the CHRAJ. 
This suggests that a lot of respondents had simply not heard of them and therefore felt they 
could not ‘trust’ them (a very rational response). This is further confirmed by looking at the 
‘don’t trust at all’ ratings – a response which can be taken as a definitely or strongly held 
negative attitude (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Mass survey: trust rankings – ‘would not trust at all’ 
 
Rank (out of 17)  Type of DSI  % who say ‘would not trust at all’ 
1  Fetish priest  87.8 
2  School head teacher  26.7 
3  Agriculture Department Officer  20.9 
4  Police  18.7 
15  CHRAJ  8.4 
16  CLS  8.3 
 
 
Here, the authority not trusted by the largest number of respondents was a ‘spiritual leader’ such 
as fetish priest (87.8% of respondents), followed a long way down the scale by school head 
teacher (26.7%) and Agricultural Department Officer (20.9%). Yet the CLS and the CHRAJ 
were bottom of the list, with only 8.4% and 8.3% saying they did not trust them at all – fewer 
even than village chief! In other words, respondents were not willing to say they trusted a 
chiefly institution such as the CLS ‘a lot’ because they hadn’t really heard of it; but because 
they knew little of it, they didn’t feel strongly enough about it to say they didn’t trust it ‘at all’ 
either. Their entirely reasonable response was a neutral one.  
 
For these reasons, one can interpret the high trust rankings for village and paramount chiefs, 
family heads and religious leaders as responses to a hypothetical reputational question. It was 
only when asked to consider questions about fairness and justice in a more specific context that 
they gave answers which revealed what they really valued or understood about the fair 
settlement of disputes. Whether respondents actually saw particular DSIs as likely to offer the 
kind of justice they preferred cannot be deduced from the general trust question; this only 
emerged from the more detailed contextual questioning about particular cases, and of course 
from the survey of litigants’ behaviour, relating to why their case ended up in a particular DSI. 
(In this respect, the idea of ‘choice’ itself has always to be understood in the context of other 
determining factors such as the behaviour of the different parties (willingness to compromise, 
the issues at stake) as well as the remedies sought and purely practical questions of availability 
and proximity.  
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4 The litigants’ experiences of dispute settlement 
 
4.1 The Magistrate’s Courts  
 
199 respondents were interviewed in this purposive survey, all litigants with current cases in the 
Magistrate’s Courts of the two case-study Districts. Respondents were chosen over a five to six 
month period focusing on covering all those with land or inheritance, property and breach of 
contract cases, with a small selection of others involved in matrimonial, theft and defamation 
cases. 58.7% of respondents were men and 41.3% were women. Compared to the general 
population of the two Districts, the litigants were an older group (48.3% aged over 40), and 
were much more highly educated than the average population (36.2% had a secondary or post-
secondary education – the latter being 17.1% of the total) whilst only 9.5% were illiterate.11  
 
In assessing what kinds of expectations litigants had of the kind of justice they could get at the 
Magistrate’s Court, we first tried to establish why they had chosen to use the Court, rather than 
any of the other possible DSIs which exist in the legally plural context of Ghana. The fact that 
53.3% of the respondents had come straight to the Magistrate’s Court without trying any other 
form of dispute settlement first, shows the powerful attraction of the kinds of legal remedies 
offered by these Courts. Of those who had tried another DSI first (44.2%), 56.8% had used 
family elders or community elders, and only 9.1% a chief’s traditional court—much fewer than 
the number who had used Unit Committee or District Assembly officials or other bodies 
(12.5%) – another contrast with the conventional view that most people would prefer to go to 
their village chief first. When asked why they thought the Magistrate’s Court was a better option 
than the initial DSI they had used, the largest group – 41% – said it was because it offered an 
‘applicable law’ and /or enforceable judgement, whilst the next largest group focused on the 
attraction of an impartial judge and a procedure which would consider all the facts in order to 
reach the truth (10.2%).  
 
How people really wanted their dispute to be settled was also revealed quite strongly by their 
responses to the question of whether, and for what reason, they considered it had been 
‘worthwhile’ taking their case to the Magistrates Court. 53.3% gave an unequivocal ‘yes’, 
whilst another 10.6% said ‘to some extent’ – making a majority of 63.9% with a positive view; 
but 12.1% said they couldn’t say, whilst 24.1% gave a definite ‘no’.  
 
In explaining their reasons (Figure 4), the most important perspective was again the concern 
with a certain remedy – 33.4% said that what made it worthwhile was the prospect of ‘changing 
the behaviour’ of the other party’ through an enforceable judgement based on law. Some linked 
this to the failure of amicable settlement to produce a result. If those who made a negative point 
of this – namely that they were dissatisfied because of the slowness or even failure of the court 
to enforce the judgement – are added then the total giving this kind of reason was 36.9%. To 
this might be linked the smaller group who insisted that all they wanted was to ‘win’, which is a 
cruder way of saying much the same thing – making a total of 45% who felt that enforcement or 
getting a certain remedy were what they most valued from the court process.  
                                                 
11  According to the 2000 Ghana census, 20% of the population aged over 15 in the Accra Region District 
were illiterate and 39% in the Brong-Ahafo Region District. The figures for those with a secondary or 
post secondary educational level were 25.6% and 11. 5% although this included all those over the age 
of six, so somewhat overstates the level for the adult population.  
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Figure 4: Litigants survey (Magistrate’s Court): worthwhile going to court 
(reasons)? 
 
 
 
Another much smaller group emphasised that what they thought was most important was the 
fact that the court had acted impartially and enabled the truth to come out (6.5%).  
 
But opinion was clearly divided about whether it had been worthwhile going to court; a large 
minority (17.7%) felt that going to court had been unnecessary, and argued that it could all have 
been resolved through negotiation (i.e. an amicable settlement) although in many cases they 
blamed the other party for stubbornness. (A small group – 4.5% – complained that they hadn’t 
chosen to come to court anyway, but had been forced by a summons). A further 3.5% said it had 
been unnecessary because there had not been sufficient evidence, making a total of 25.5% who 
felt it had been unnecessary for some reason.  
 
Some on the positive side also praised the court process for facilitating a ‘peaceful’ settlement, 
or enabling the parties to resolve their differences and to ‘understand each other’ (5%). So it is 
clear that there was an appetite amongst even formal court litigants for amicable or negotiated 
settlements, although still very much a minority.  
 
Finally, again it should be noted that only a few focused on cost or delay issues – 4% said the 
process was too slow, and 3.5% that it was too expensive or a waste of money.  
 
How did the litigants relate their experience of the Magistrate’s Court to their idea of what 
makes a fair or just dispute settlement? We looked first at those whose case had been settled and 
asked how they viewed the verdict. Given that most respondents were currently involved in 
cases, the number whose cases had actually been concluded was inevitably quite limited – only 
36.7% of the total, so their opinions cannot be taken as representative of the whole group. 
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Nonetheless, when asked to rate the verdict on a four point scale, from ‘not at all fair’ to ‘very 
fair’, 68.5% rated it ‘very fair’, and 20.5% ‘somewhat fair’, making at total of 89% of those who 
had got a verdict.  
 
Respondents were then asked to explain WHY they rated the verdict fair or unfair, and the 
answers provide an interesting contrast with the popular survey (Figure 5). The litigants in the 
Magistrate’s Court were clearly interested in seeking legal remedies or a clear resolution of the 
case. So it is unsurprising that the most cited reason for saying the verdict was fair or unfair 
focused on the allocation and acceptance of fault or liability: 40% argued that what really 
mattered was that the ‘truth had come out’ and that the defendant (in some cases themselves) 
had – or had not – accepted the truth of the accusations or problems raised. Here we see some 
similarity with popular opinion, particularly those who had experienced a case, in that there was 
a concern to establish the ‘truth’ about the facts, but in a context of allocation of liability. 
Related to this, 17.8% said that the fairness or unfairness of the verdict was based on whether 
both sides had properly been heard. Thus nearly 60% saw fairness as either getting the truth to 
come out and be accepted by both parties, or (a related idea) the fact that both sides had been 
properly heard.  
 
Figure 5: Litigants survey (Magistrate’s Court): why was verdict fair/unfair (%) 
 
 
 
The second largest group (32.8%) focused on the remedy – either they had got the ruling they 
wanted or in fact they disagreed with it (e.g. didn’t agree with the amount of compensation). 
Most significantly, however, none made any mention of the idea that the verdict was good 
because a compromise had been reached; nonetheless, it is interesting that many litigants 
wanted the ‘guilty’ party to accept and understand their fault, and were not satisfied with just 
winning. They wanted to give the judicial process a moral dimension.  
 
The litigants overall also had a generally positive view of the trial process; when asked to 
comment (in an open ended question) on how they thought the judge had conducted the 
hearings, the overwhelming majority (72.2%) made positive comments. In an echo of the views 
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expressed in the popular survey, they tended to focus on the extent to which the judge seemed to 
behave as a balanced, honest or helpful person. The largest single group (37%) used terms such 
as ‘helpful’, patient, polite or friendly, whilst the next largest group (18%)  emphasised qualities 
such as professional competence, firmness and ‘correctness’ (following the law).  But an almost 
similar proportion (17.4%) felt that the proceedings were fair and impartial – often using the 
same phrase as respondents in the mass survey, ‘seeking the truth’. On the negative side, there 
were complaints that judges did not listen to the parties, and worries by some that they were 
sometimes too angry or ‘strict’. But only a remarkably small number made accusations of bias 
or lack of impartiality (3.6%). Another small group made mixed comments, noting both good 
and bad points in the conduct of the trial (5.1%).  
 
To what extent did litigants in the Magistrate’s Courts share any of the understandings and 
concerns about justice revealed in the popular survey? Clearly, these litigants were involved in a 
very specific experience, and perhaps the most important point to note is that when people go to 
a state court even at the first instance level, they are definitely seeking a clear legal remedy 
which is going to be enforced. This was the motivation of the largest single group of 
respondents (45%). Nevertheless there is some evidence that, amongst those who resort to a 
Magistrate’s Court, there is an acknowledgement that fairness requires the ‘truth’ to be 
established and recognised by all parties , or that due process (hearing both sides) is required 
(58% of those who had received a verdict). The perspective of these litigants on the trial process 
itself also echoed the popular view insofar as what they saw as most significant in the conduct 
of the judge were qualities of balance, helpfulness, patience and impartiality.  
 
A substantial minority (17.7%), however, would have preferred an ‘alternative’ form of 
settlement based on negotiation or compromise, and some (5.5%) even saw the court as a 
method of providing a peaceful way of resolving differences. In fact, 17.1% of the sample had 
tried the Court-attached ADR. Here one sees some echo of the views expressed in the popular 
survey, particularly those in Subset 2 (those who had witnessed a case), 28% of whom spoke of 
the importance of mutual acceptance of a verdict and reconciliation.12 
 
4.2 The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)  
 
48 respondents who had disputes being heard by the CHRAJ in the two Districts over a six 
month period were interviewed. The sample deliberately included equal numbers of men and 
women and revealed a much younger profile compared to the Magistrate’s Courts and the CLSs: 
over 60% were under 40 years of age. Their modal level of education was also lower than the 
other two DSIs – 52% Junior Secondary or the old Middle School Leaving Certificate. But the 
District case statistics show that the majority of complainants going to CHRAJ were women 
bringing cases against men for maintenance of children, disagreement over custody of children 
(in some cases accusations of abduction of children), breaches of promise to marry, and 
maintenance after separation or divorce, often mixed with accusations of domestic violence and 
abuse. Many of the child maintenance cases involved very young women – schoolgirls and 
students – who had been abandoned immediately after getting pregnant, and were seeking 
                                                 
12  It is important to distinguish this view from the idea of acceptance of the truth by both parties, in 
which what is sought is that the party found to be at fault accepts that the truthfulness of the verdict. 
This is somewhat different from the idea of reconciliation through compromise. 
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support for their education as well as child maintenance. Others involved failed relationships 
after some years of cohabitation, usually because the man had taken up with a new woman.  
 
The choice of CHRAJ seemed to have been mainly determined by practical considerations 
relating to its location, and the fact that its services were free, although a fifth of respondents 
mentioned its ‘good reputation’.  But half of the respondents – mainly the men – had been 
summoned anyway so had not really exercised any ‘choice’. Of those whose case had been 
settled, 61% felt that it had been fair and they were satisfied with the result; but one interesting 
aspect was that a small group were dissatisfied even though they acknowledged it was fair.  
Closer analysis revealed that defendants were in fact more likely to be satisfied that the verdict 
was fair and plaintiffs were more likely to say it was fair but they were dissatisfied. This shows 
very clearly the impact of a process which emphasises compromise – people can emerge feeling 
that they have not really got all that they wanted or felt entitled to, whilst the defendants feel 
that they have done a good deal (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Litigants’ survey (CHRAJ): overall satisfaction with decision, plaintiffs and 
defendants 
 
 
 
In fact when discussing their cases, the CHRAJ respondents did not really emphasise 
compromise as the core value; the largest group (42%) saw the verdict as being a determination 
of facts (bringing out the truth) or even an application of ‘the law’. But another significant 
group saw the process as having a moral dimension – namely that it was about confirming 
duties to care for or provide for children (Table 4), particularly in maintenance cases. Yet the 
mediators, when questioned, saw this as a matter of law. These findings show how people who 
sought an ADR-type settlement through the CHRAJ were primarily concerned to get the person 
who they felt had wronged them to  acknowledge the truth and ‘do the right thing’ – even if they 
had to accept a compromise which they didn’t necessarily feel was adequate. Overall, the 
outcomes were such that 71% of the respondents felt that the CHRAJ was the ‘best way of 
settling disputes’.  
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Table 4: CHRAJ: reasons for decision 
 
 
4.3 The Customary Land Secretariats (CLS)  
 
Forty respondents who had or had previously had disputes heard by a CLS were interviewed.  It 
should be noted however that in the Accra Region, the CLS in the District was a relatively 
restricted Ga ‘family land’ institution and most of the cases reviewed had been heard by a 
hybrid committee funded and administered by the District Assembly (DA): the Land and 
Chieftaincy Disputes Resolution Committee. This body was chaired by the local chief together 
with three representatives of the Traditional Council as well as the Queen Mother and two other 
traditional chiefs. But it also included the District Police Superintendent, the Director of the 
CHRAJ, the Presiding Member of the DA, the Chair of the DA Development Committee and 
two other DA members. The presence of the police was justified on the grounds that in this 
District land or chieftaincy disputes frequently present security issues and a danger to peace and 
order which may require police involvement. In fact, the Committee was in many respects an 
aspect of the District security apparatus. The CLS in the Brong-Ahafo Region was situated in 
the palace of the Paramount Chief and chaired by the chief’s Krontihene (the second-in-
command in the Akan traditional hierarchy). But it also included a representative of the District 
Assembly (e.g. the Town Planning Officer or District Surveyor) and a representative of one of 
the state land sector agencies, such as the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands. This CLS 
heard more cases than the Accra committee but still only a handful (12) over six months 
compared to the 350 per year in the local CHRAJ office.  
 
The majority of the litigants in the CLS were older men (70%), with generally quite high levels 
of education (47% with secondary or post secondary levels). When asked why they had chosen 
to go to the CLS, the majority (60%) said that they saw it as the most appropriate in terms of its 
jurisdiction (customary land), and its reputation or competence. But only 52% were both 
satisfied with the verdict and felt it was ‘fair’; and only 47.5% felt it was the ‘best way of 
settling disputes’. When asked what would be a better alternative, most talked about the need 
for special land courts, which would be more competent to deal with all the matters and enforce 
judgements – similar to the attitudes of those who used the Magistrate’s Courts.  
 
When discussing the reasons for the verdict, the most interesting theme to emerge was the 
strong emphasis which the litigants put on ‘bringing out the true facts’ (74% overall); nearly 
half of those interviewed said that the verdict revolved around formal documentary evidence. 
The committee panels themselves tended to emphasise a ‘fact finding’ approach rather than 
applications of customary law or traditional norms. There was little or no interest in 
‘compromise’ or reconciliation. Indeed, in many cases the ‘winners’ were observed being 
 Valid Percent
Moral duty to provide, or care for children 34.5
Determination on facts 27.6
Compromise 17.2
Used applicable law 17.2
One party gave up/ admitted liability 3.5
Total 100.0
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doused in white powder by their entourage, a traditional way of celebrating victory. So they 
were clearly very interested in establishing fault. The idea that there was a winner and loser was 
encouraged by the practice of making only the losing party forfeit his ‘advance against costs’ to 
the CLS panel – in spite of the official rhetoric which portrays the CLS as a form of classic 
ADR.  
 
5 Congruence between popular concepts of justice, and the 
procedures of the three DSIs 
 
5.1 Summary of local values 
 
The evidence from the mass survey, the interviews with litigants and observation of cases show 
that when people in Ghana find themselves involved in a conflict or dispute, or are asked to 
think about such a situation, they have particular sets of ideas about what they want and value 
from any dispute settlement process. These are ideas which we may describe as ‘popular 
concepts of fairness and justice’, and they applied to all kinds of case, whether they involved 
disputes over property or land, business, landlord-tenant relations or matrimonial and sexual 
relations.  
 
What our respondents seemed to value most strongly was a judge or arbitrator perceived to be 
impartial and competent, who can ensure that the true facts come out and the disputing parties 
are given a fair chance to present their stories. In short, the local concept of ‘fairness’ is 
identified with the idea of a ‘balanced process’. This does not mean that people necessarily 
accept the ‘adversarial’ view of due process embedded in the state courts applying Anglo-
Ghanaian common law. Ghanaians want to see both parties to a case given an equal hearing, but 
do not necessarily see justice as emerging from a contest, like a debating society competition. 
The emphasis of most of our respondents was on the ‘truth’ coming out, and also on the need 
for the parties involved to acknowledge or accept the truth, once established. If one of the 
parties was at fault, people thought this should be publicly accepted by that party. This was a 
view which emerged most strongly from those who had had personal experience of a case, and 
litigants in the Magistrate’s Courts.  
 
The evidence also shows that a substantial number of people saw justice as best served through 
reconciliation and peaceful or amicable settlement. In some respects, ‘mutual acceptance’ of the 
truth of the findings can be seen as elements of a process which may ultimately make 
reconciliation possible. But it is not the same as compromise, where the parties simply agree to 
‘split the difference’ for the sake of a settlement, or restoration of harmonious social relations.  
In this sense, amicable settlement may be seen as a kind of remedy, a way of avoiding going to 
court. 
 
The remedy which people seek or expect was in fact an important determinant of how the 
justice process was perceived, and was clearly linked to the subject matter and the history of the 
case. Thus many disputants used informal, non-state DSIs initially (family, respected 
community leaders, village chiefs, religious or political leaders), perhaps believing that they 
offered the kind of balanced and impartial justice they respected, but hoping for an amicable 
private settlement in which the matter could be resolved. But with land cases, as well as intra-
family property disputes or contract and debt cases, the level of hostility and even violence is 
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often such that this kind of dispute resolution fails. Going to a state-supported and free dispute 
resolution service such as that offered by the CHRAJ may be seen as the next alternative when 
informal or private settlement fails or is simply seen as inappropriate. Yet, as the experiences of 
those who used the CHRAJ show, compromise is not always what people want nor is it even in 
their best interests.  
 
Thus by the time the disputants arrive in court, the plaintiffs are resolutely seeking a clear and 
enforceable remedy which will give a declaration of title, enforce specific actions on the 
defendants, pay what is owed or award damages.  
 
The strong interest in establishing fault and certainty of enforcement is vividly confirmed by the 
extraordinarily low rates of ‘out of court’ settlement in Ghana (Crook et al., 2007). It is possible 
that the numbers of respondents expressing a belief in amicable settlement may in fact be a 
result of current policies emphasising ADR and the availability of Court-attached ADR, 
although the extent of their impact should not be exaggerated.  
 
5.2 The legitimacy of the Magistrate’s Courts 
 
The codes or concepts of justice underlying the work of the judges in the Magistrates Courts 
seemed to derive quite strongly from their professional self identity, based on their common law 
training and socialisation into the traditions of the Ghanaian judiciary. The judges proclaimed 
their belief that they must be impartial and that the purpose of the judicial process was to 
‘establish the truth’ in relation to the facts of a case, and to apply the principles of law including 
customary law where appropriate. This classic common law view, which is embodied in the 
adversarial court system, sees justice primarily in terms of ‘due process’ (Dowrick, 1961). 
Hence one Magistrate felt fairness derived from an assessment of the arguments put forward by 
the parties in court; the truth emerges from letting the parties make their cases. 13 In Court, they 
routinely reminded litigants that they must tell the truth. But they also talk the language of rights 
– ironically, more so than the CHRAJ officials – saying that compromise cannot be allowed to 
prevent people getting their legal rights.  
 
In terms of the codes used in practice, these Courts used a variety of laws and principles, not 
just common law and statute. They applied established customary laws where the judge thought 
they were appropriate, e.g. Akan matrilineal inheritance or marriage custom, and in some 
observed cases used Ghanaian ‘cultural principles’ such as respect for the elderly. In some of 
the court-attached ADR mediations the mediators were even observed invoking evangelical 
Christian ideas which are now very widespread amongst the general population.  
 
Although the Magistrates Courts retain the formal atmosphere of a state court in which strict 
order is kept, witnesses swear an oath, and the judge is an authoritative figure sitting on a raised 
platform, hybridity is clearly emerging in the use of various kinds of informal, non-legal 
procedures. Local languages are used in the vast majority of cases with English only used by the 
                                                 
13  Limited evidence from the behaviour of members of the public in court suggests that the role of 
lawyers in fighting for their clients is not well understood or appreciated; most people blame lawyers 
for what they see as prolonging cases and making life difficult. The judges themselves blame lawyers 
for many of the difficulties experienced by the state courts, although for more cogent reasons, 
predominantly their incompetence and disorganisation. 
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judge to record his or her notes. The judges frequently adopt inquisitorial or even conversational 
strategies in order to facilitate the disclosure of facts by parties and witnesses, especially in the 
absence of lawyers – or even because of the (frequent) incompetence of counsel! They give 
advice and suggest ways of settling.  This is particularly the case when they are sitting as a 
Family Tribunal, and they are now routinely encouraging resort to ADR either to the official 
ADR service in Accra, or to informally commissioned arbitrators elsewhere. Official ADR 
settlements benefit from the fact that they have to be recorded as ‘consent judgements’ by the 
Court, and thus have enforceability.  
 
The values of justice and the procedures used in the Magistrate’s Courts seem, therefore, to 
correspond very closely to the dominant view of justice and fairness put forward by the 
respondents in the popular survey and in the surveys of litigants. The only difference is that 
ordinary people put less of a premium on the adversarial process itself, seeing justice not as a 
competition to see who puts forward the best arguments, but a genuine search for the truth 
which comes from allowing both parties to fully bring out the facts. And more than the judges, 
perhaps, ordinary people want the truth to be confirmed by acknowledgement of fault and its 
acceptance by both parties. The Courts also offered the kinds of enforceable remedies sought by 
litigants.  
 
5.3 The legitimacy of the CHRAJ mediation service 
 
The CHRAJ District-level mediation service offered something rather unique and very different 
from both the CLSs/chiefs and more informal, community or family-based arbitration. In many 
ways, the CHRAJ mediations corresponded  most closely to the ideal model of ADR, dealing 
primarily with disputes between private individuals, settled in private in a completely relaxed 
and informal atmosphere by an impartial mediator who is a ‘stranger’ in local society. What is 
of the greatest interest is that the CHRAJ mediators rarely made use of either customary or legal 
principles, particularly in relation to marriage or sexual relations, but focused intensively on 
reaching agreed compromises often based on monetary compensation. The emphasis on 
compromise was sometimes so strong that it was allowed to override the strict legal or 
customary rights of parties – which can be problematic in many matrimonial or sexual violence 
cases, which tend to form a large number, if not the majority, of their cases. The reliance on 
‘common sense’ ideas in the Ghanaian context also led to the adoption of a variety of codes of 
justice, ranging from human rights principles to the Christian principles of the mediator or 
cultural beliefs about respect for the elderly.  
 
The congruence of the CHRAJ mediations with popular understandings of justice is very strong: 
its District officers, trained in ADR and personally committed to a ‘human rights’ code of 
ethics, do provide an impartial arbitration which does give all parties a real (and unrushed) 
opportunity to put their case in a friendly, non-coercive atmosphere. They have the authority 
which comes from being a state, constitutionally protected and independent institution. And, 
unlike the more informal, non-state DSIs, they do have some capacity to implement judgements. 
Although they cannot enforce directly like a court of law, they facilitate compensation payments 
by ordering them to be paid and collected via their offices. If the agreements are not respected it 
is immediately obvious and disgruntled parties can ask for further action, or they may 
subsequently go to court.  
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One problem with the CHRAJ procedures is that the emphasis on compromise and agreement 
above all else can still result in pressure on weaker parties – particularly the many vulnerable 
women who seek their help – to accept settlements which do not really serve their best interests 
or may prevent them from obtaining their full legal rights. This has to be balanced against the 
fact that they are successfully getting some kind of recompense for vulnerable or poor people 
who probably would not have dared to go to a court at all. 
 
5.4 The legitimacy of the CLSs and Land and Chieftaincy Disputes Resolution 
Committee 
 
Although the CLSs are supposed to be based on the existing, formally defined Traditional 
Authorities, they are still ‘new’ institutions which are little known to the public, partly because 
only small numbers of pilot CLSs have as yet been set up and even fewer are fully operational. 
The mixed DA/Chieftaincy Committees are even less well known and are the product of special 
initiatives in particular Districts on a rather random basis. 
 
When asked about their principles of adjudication the chiefs and CLS officials routinely 
invoked the language of ADR and said that they promoted ‘win-win’ settlements based on 
compromise and restorative justice. But these commitments seemed more reflective of the 
official language of government policy than what happens in practice. Whilst in some cases 
there was reference to the importance of restoring social harmony or peace, other aspects of the 
procedures differed considerably from ADR – e.g. the resort to documentation of local histories 
and formal land claims, the concern with the rights of Stools, and consultation with local 
opinion leaders and other chiefs on the broader aspects and merits of the case. These all 
imported factors extraneous to the narrow question of the dispute between the parties. But the 
dominant characteristic of the CLS procedures was in fact a concern to establish the ‘facts of the 
case’; rules of judicially established customary law, or other land laws were rarely applied. And 
many panels were clearly trying to establish who the winning party was, arguing ‘there is only 
one truth’.  
 
The procedures themselves, although conducted in local languages, combined formal elements 
of the state court system (written summons in English, taking of evidence and cross examination 
of parties) with the formal rituals and protocols of the traditional system. Many of the latter 
were quite intimidating to ordinary citizens and certainly do not conform to the basic principle 
of ADR which is that the mediator should be a neutral figure who can engage informally with 
the parties to facilitate agreement. In Brong-Ahafo the hearings took place in the Paramount 
Chief’s Palace and witnesses had to swear oaths by stepping on the money which had been paid 
in. Traditional hierarchies were reproduced quite strongly in the court format: litigants who 
were family heads, elders or chiefs, were given chairs and allowed to wear their sandals.  
Ordinary ‘subjects’ had to stand, and were reminded sternly to remove their sandals if they 
approached the chiefs with them still on.14 Such a format also made the panel relatively 
                                                 
14  It has to be remembered that in Ghana the superior chiefs continue to wield a political authority which 
until recently was a formal part of the governmental system of Native Authorities (NAs) and Native 
Courts (NCs) created by the British. The NAs gave an institutional, legal and economic basis to the 
chieftaincy which both consolidated the political identities of the pre-colonial entities upon which they 
were (more or less) based and produced a powerful ‘neo-traditional’ elite of wealthy and western- 
educated chiefs who were a major bulwark of colonial society. Since independence they have (in spite 
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unfriendly to women and to strangers or migrant farmers; there was  evidence that strangers or 
settler farmers felt at a distinct disadvantage and were reluctant to use it, whilst the 
predominantly ‘male elders and chiefs ‘ membership and traditional atmosphere of a Paramount 
Chief’s court also frightened off female litigants.  
 
The DA Land and Chieftaincy Disputes Resolution Committee in peri-urban Accra had more 
flexible procedures which seemed to depend on the importance and type of case: with some 
cases, a ‘modern’ ADR approach was adopted, in others formal traditional protocols and  
language were used (‘high’ or idiomatic Ga comprehensible only to indigenous citizens of high 
status), whilst in important inter-community cases the hearing resembled more of a traditional 
chief’s court with large numbers of people in attendance.  
 
It would seem evident, therefore, that the procedures and codes used in chiefs’ traditional courts 
did diverge in many ways from popular concerns with balanced and impartial due process. This 
is not to say that individual chiefs may not be respected individually as able to adjudicate wisely 
and impartially, but the logic of traditional procedures and codes can make this difficult to 
achieve if they are allowed to override the rights of individual parties and at the same time 
reinforce social and economic hierarchies.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The data from our surveys and other observations have provided some evidence on the 
relationship between, on the one hand, what ordinary people and the users of these DSIs 
actually think about justice and dispute settlement, and, on the other hand, what these 
institutions are offering in practice. The comparison of the three kinds of local dispute 
settlement institution revealed that the Magistrate’s Courts were highly congruent with popular 
values and expectations, and offered the majority of litigants what they were seeking. The 
CHRAJ ADR mediations were also clearly attuned to important sets of beliefs and needs, 
especially for vulnerable people such as the poor and young women who could not afford or 
were afraid to use, formal courts, and wanted impartial, amicable settlement. But they did not 
necessarily deliver enforceable remedies or fully protect rights. The customary-based CLS land 
dispute committees seemed the least attuned to popular ideas and expectations about how to 
settle land disputes, catering to a relatively narrow and elite set of clients using very formal 
traditional procedures.  
 
Two particularly interesting aspects of the findings may be highlighted.  
 
First, is the challenge they present to the conventional, indeed stereotypical picture of popular 
ideas about justice long presented in much of the literature. Because most Ghanaians will, if 
asked, pay respect to the institutions of chieftaincy, and chiefs administer the customary land 
relations which involve the majority of the population, it is assumed that:  
 
a) the majority of citizens prefer the ‘informal’ customary justice or dispute settlement 
institutions as offered by chiefs; and  
                                                                                                                                               
of the loss of many formal powers) remained an institutionalised and important part of the national 
political elite, as well as being the recognised custodians (‘allodial owners’) and administrators of 
lands held under customary tenure.  
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b) customary or traditional justice means social reconciliation and compromise rather than 
legal remedies, as validated and sanctioned by family and community involvement.  
 
In this picture of traditional and ‘therefore’ popular justice, impartiality is presented as less 
important than knowledge of how to resolve disputes in a context of community power 
relations. And reconciliation, or restorative justice, is presented as the most valued outcome. But 
if this is true, why were the CLS land dispute committees so apparently divorced from popular 
values and expectations?  Does this mean that custom or tradition is no longer respected? Or 
that the chiefs are seen as not able to provide the impartial and balanced justice which people 
say that they value?  
 
One possible explanation is that conventional descriptions of customary or traditional justice are 
in fact misleading or even mistaken, particularly the emphasis on restorative justice. We have 
already seen how the identification of ‘customary’ with ‘informal’ is mistaken. Any brief 
acquaintance with the history and culture of the Akan and other kingdoms of Ghana would 
suffice to counteract this notion (Wilks, 1975; McCaskie, 1995). The powerful hierarchies of 
these polities were not only consolidated but further strengthened under the colonial Indirect 
Rule system and the Native Courts played a particularly important role in the development of 
judicially recognised customary law (see Woodman, 1996; Crook, 2008). But the kinds of 
procedures and values which were taken up into the Native Courts have often been forgotten 
(colonial customary law at least in West Africa, was not all a complete ‘invention’, after all – 
contra Chanock, 1985).  
 
One of the earliest descriptions of traditional procedures in the courts of the higher Ashanti 
chiefs is to be found in Rattray’s classic anthropology text published in 1929 (Rattray, 1969). 
Revisiting Rattray is instructive. He first of all carefully distinguishes between minor quarrels 
and cases which could be settled by family heads or respected elders and cases which were 
brought before the court of a higher (Divisional or Head) chief. In the former, the practice was 
indeed to aim at mpata or reconciliation in which the injured party would gracefully accept an 
apology, symbolised by a gift of an egg or a fowl, or even gold dust (Rattray, 1969: 389). In the 
chief’s court it was a different story. The procedure was triggered by the disputing parties 
swearing the chief’s oath. In so doing, both parties became liable to extreme sanctions including 
death if they lost their case. The trial itself was a terrifying procedure, not just because of the 
superior power of the chief and his council, but also because it was subject to the supernatural 
sanctions of various gods and spiritual forces. The mysterious power of the chief was enhanced 
by having all discourse filtered through a spokesman or ‘linguist’. Interestingly, the parties were 
‘not expected to tell the truth’ and did not take an oath to do this (Rattray, 1969: 388). It was the 
job of the court and the witnesses to bring out the truth. Witnesses were sworn on gods chosen 
by the chief, with the threat of awful consequences. In particular, Rattray notes that the court 
was not interested in reconciliation, but in establishing fault. (If all else failed, the court would 
resort to various ordeals). There were ‘degrees of guilt’ which determined whether the party at 
fault would be executed or could ‘pay for his head’ by giving a thank-offering. Moreover, as 
Rattray notes, the power and status of chiefs had come to be associated with how successful 
they were at attracting cases, because of the revenue which could be derived from them (1969: 
388).  
 
Of course many of these practices were modified as the Native Courts developed during the 
1930s and onwards, absorbing or borrowing in the process many aspects of British law 
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(Gocking, 1993).  But many of the attitudes persisted – the British rulers constantly criticised 
the chiefs for their interest in the revenue-raising aspects of justice, for instance – and can still 
be discerned today, even though the Native Courts were abolished in 1958. The chiefs continued 
to run their ‘courts’ settling land and other disputes in the so-called ‘informal sector’ after 
independence, with the most powerful chiefs such as the Asantehene still exercising real power 
over land matters.15 Hence the traditional protocols, procedures and rituals survived, of which 
the concern with fault finding is still very evident. In fact, as Woodman has argued, the 
decoupling of the chiefs’ courts from the formal common law courts over the past 50 years has 
probably encouraged an increased divergence between ‘lawyers’ customary law’ and ‘living or 
practised’ customary law (Woodman, 1996; 2001); new rules have developed whilst older and 
maybe undesirable  practices have never been reformed. It is therefore not surprising that when 
the government revived a state-sponsored form of chiefly justice such as the CLS land disputes 
committees, the traditional formalities, the hierarchical atmosphere and the concern to establish 
fault were reproduced relatively unchanged in spite of the presence of state-sector 
representatives on the panels.  
 
The old distinction between the very local level family and village headman forms of dispute 
resolution (which are seen as appropriate for amicable settlement) and the tribunals of the higher 
chiefs is also very evident in popular perceptions. And it could even be argued that there are 
echoes of the chiefly traditions in the popular concern for the party at fault to publicly 
acknowledge that the truth has come out.  
 
Scholars who have studied the operations of the chiefs’ unofficial courts since 1958 have also 
commented on how well-established traditional rules of evidence continue to be observed. 
Berry’s observations of the courts of high ranking Asante chiefs report on how rival claims to 
land are assessed through detailed consideration of historical genealogies and oral histories of 
settlement (Berry, 1997; 2001). The processes of reasoning for producing a result are very 
different from modern or forensic rules of evidence, and the remedies are very different 
(Woodman, 1996). Ideologies of ‘genealogical legitimacy’ mean, as Berry has argued, that 
rights to land, for instance, flow from establishing social group membership and the historic 
claims of those groups. She sees customary dispute resolution over land, therefore, not as a 
once-and-for- all declaration of title but as a constant process of ‘negotiation’, subject to change 
with each new dispute and new generation. This of course is simply another way of saying that 
it is rooted in political power relations within the community – which means that decisions 
reflect inequalities of power, not some abstract ‘impartiality’ (cf. Peters, 2002).  
 
It can be argued, therefore, that stereotypes of traditional chiefly justice as being about 
reconciliation or restorative justice are indeed misleading. Insofar as the CLSs are offering some 
contemporary version of a customary court procedure they are not necessarily going to privilege 
reconciliation; and neither are they plausibly going to offer an ADR-type mediation in which an 
impartial stranger focuses on balancing the claims of two individuals without use of unequal 
power resources. The CLS panels are too embedded in the power relations of local land 
ownership and social hierarchies to offer this kind of settlement. Their concern is more to 
establish rightful claims according to customary rules of historical legitimacy. Ordinary citizens 
still respect chieftaincy and ‘tradition’ in Ghana, but they are unlikely to associate a chief’s 
                                                 
15  The Asantehene’s full court when assembled still counts up to two hundred members (chiefs and sub-
chiefs, Kumasi clan chiefs and officials) and is a highly ritualised affair (Crook, 2008). 
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court, as an institution, with their vision of justice as an impartial process for bringing out the 
true facts with an enforceable remedy. And even if they do want reconciliation or an amicable 
settlement, the chief’s court does not necessarily offer that either. They are only likely to resort 
to a chiefly institution if they already involved in a set of relationships over land which suggests 
that the chief will look on their claim favourably. It is only at the family or very local level that 
informal modes of traditional dispute settlement may be resorted to, in the hope of a fair and 
balanced settlement.  
 
Secondly, it is worth emphasising the significance of the positive findings on the Magistrate’s 
Courts and the CHRAJ. A strong case can be made that the first instance state courts in Ghana 
do present a form of justice which corresponds with popular understandings of justice and 
fairness (due process and impartiality) and also offers the certainty and enforceability of 
remedies which people want if attempts to find amicable settlement have failed. State courts and 
agencies have been too readily dismissed in favour of so-called ‘informal’ solutions to the need 
for better and more legitimate forms of public dispute settlement. It is true, of course, that the 
state courts have a crisis of effectiveness; they are unable to cope with the huge and increasing 
numbers of suits lodged.16 In this sense, the Magistrate’s Courts are the victims of their own 
popularity, but this does not mean they should be abandoned; they rather need reform, resources 
and new ways of working. Various measures could focus on developing and encouraging the 
informalities and judicial activism already being practised by Magistrates, and weaknesses in 
court administration are undoubtedly responsible for much of the backlog caused by constant 
adjournments. Above all, the popular reluctance to consider out-of-court settlement has to be 
tackled – and this is perhaps a ‘cultural’ matter, to which ADR is seen as the solution. But ADR 
will not address this rooted behaviour unless it is implemented in very specific ways.  
 
As argued, it is difficult to see ADR solutions as emerging directly from customary institutions 
unless they change in ways which will probably make them lose what makes them culturally 
unique and important. Informal ADR is in any case resorted to by large numbers of ordinary 
citizens from a variety of other social institutions and individuals. But for ADR to be offered in 
its most professional form, respectful of both human rights requirements and popular ideas of 
justice, the state needs to guarantee the training and maintenance of appropriate standards. This 
is where institutions such as the CHRAJ or the Court-attached ADR offer such positive 
possibilities; they have real congruence with popular values about procedure and impartiality, 
and offer enforcement of remedies. If their reach could be extended and the legal profession 
brought on board, they might begin to make an impact. But there is still a need to be careful of 
over-emphasis on compromise, without clear guides on what ‘codes’ or principles are being 
implemented. Above all they must satisfy the most basic popular value which seems to emerge 
from the research; they must ensure that the ‘truth comes out’.  
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Annex Tables 
 
Table A1: Mass survey: distribution of respondents by sex 
 Valid Percent 
Male 45.5
Female 54.5
Total 100.0
 
Table A2: Mass survey: distribution of respondents by age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Mass survey: distribution of respondents by educational level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Valid Percent 
18-25 20.9
26-39 32.7
40-64 33.3
65+ 13.1
Total 100.0
 Valid 
Percent 
No formal 
education 32.2
Primary education 17.8
JSS 38.9
SSS 8.5
Post secondary 2.4
Not known .3
Total 100.0
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Table A4: Mass survey: distribution of respondents by occupation 
 Valid Percent 
Business owner .9 
Petty trader 16.8 
Artisan 9.5 
Food crop farmer 30.5 
Cocoa farmer 20.6 
Other cash-crop farmer 4.0 
Driver 1.7 
Pensioner .6 
Civil/ public servant .3 
Security officer .4 
Semi-skilled/ unskilled labourer 1.7 
Religious leader .3 
Managerial/ professional/ technical 2.3 
Student 2.7 
Unemployed 7.8 
Total 100.0 
 
Table A5: Mass survey: origin of respondents 
 Valid Percent 
Native of this town or village 31.9 
From another town or village in this 
District 15.3 
From outside this District but within this 
Region 11.7 
Another Region 37.9 
Outside Ghana 3.1 
Total 100.0 
 
